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Paper Bullets: American Psywar in the Pacific, 1944-1945 
 
This article examines the ideas that underpinned American psychological war 
(psywar) in the Pacific. While we cannot precisely measure its effects, we can trace 
its intellectual history with more confidence. US psywar was a combination of 
scientific method and mythmaking. Assessments of the Imperial Japanese Army 
(IJA) tended to be careful, discriminating and increasingly sophisticated if not 
uniformly accurate. At the level of the battlefront, practitioners of the ‘mind war’ 
strove to overcome stereotypes and refine and complexify their view of the enemy. 
The further they moved from the battlefield towards assessments of Japanese 
military leadership, society and high politics, the more they became mythmakers, 
projecting onto Japan a powerful set of preconceived ideas. These included notions 
of the superstitious and malleable Japanese mind, the suicidal military elite, and 
the innocent symbol Emperor. In their analysis, two models of culture evolved. 
Their approach to the IJA mostly presented culture as dynamic, layered and 
conflicted, whereas their view of Japanese society was monolithic, bounded and 
timeless. This contradictory pattern can be explained by different levels of 
exposure to the subject, the practice of filling ‘knowledge gaps’ with 
preconceptions, and by American policymaking interests.    
 
Ever since John Dower wrote War without Mercy, most historians regard the war 
between the United States and Japan as one of racist brutality.1 Japanese 
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atrocities are well documented. And without equating the US war record with 
Imperial Japan, there is overwhelming evidence that the war brutalized 
American forces too. They spoke of their enemies as subhuman, routinely killed 
prisoners, and collected trophies of enemy skulls, ears, bones and teeth. Such 
behaviour was sanctioned by military officers and echoed by political elites. It 
was made possible by the immediate circumstances, the outrage over Pearl 
Harbor and enemy atrocities, the vicious island-to-island fighting conditions, 
and ideational factors such as inherited racial prejudices disseminated through 
mass media and military indoctrination. Most Americans conceived the war 
against European Axis powers as a struggle against Nazism and Fascism. They 
saw the war against Imperial Japan, though, as a clash with an entire race. 
According to the Marine Corps Gazette in November 1944, Germany’s fall into 
barbarism was the result of the ‘Hitler madness’ that would pass, whereas the 
Japanese with their ‘deep and primordial’ savagery were barbarians between the 
‘trappings of modernity.’2 Bombing European civilians might give Americans a 
moment’s pause. No such hesitation troubled them over smiting Japanese cities. 
President Truman described Japan as a ‘beast’ that only understood 
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bombardment.3 Admiral William Halsey typified the sustained public hatred. He 
declared in 1941 that ‘When this war is over, the Japanese language will be 
spoken only in Hell’4; he blocked psywar under South Pacific command because 
Japan could only be defeated by ‘fighting, fighting, fighting’, and in 1945 
opposed leniency.5 Americans defeated the regime that was responsible for the 
‘Asian holocaust.’ Paradoxically, war called forth their own genocidal passions. 
 
Yet racial hatred does not explain important parts of this history. The dynamic of 
merciless race war applies more to the conduct of the fighting, to the patterns 
and motives of combat, than to the grand strategic conduct of the war.6 In a war 
organized primarily around racial hostility, America would probably have 
bombed the imperial palace in Tokyo and Kyoto, the former capital and revered 
site of ancient palaces and shrines. Yet Secretary of War Henry Stimson and 
Truman opposed this, on the basis that it might undermine post-war 
reconciliation with Japan or drive Japan into the arms of the Soviets.7 Some argue 
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that anti-Asian racism motivated the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.8 But America’s nuclear programme was initially driven by the greater 
fear of Nazi Germany, a white European enemy. Specifically anti-Japanese or 
anti-Asian racist sentiment was not fundamental to ‘causing’ the use of nuclear 
weapons.9  
 
American’s war lacked a single theory of victory and was more enigmatic than 
exterminationist.10 Debate over the emperor’s fate and the meaning of 
unconditional surrender reflected ‘a lack of clarity at the highest levels of 
Washington as to what the American war aims were.’11 Despite public and 
congressional opinion, vengeance was trumped by the desire for orderly 
surrender and stability in Japan, and fear of a costly prolonged occupation.12 In 
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victory, the US rebuilt Japan as an allied anticommunist counterweight in Asia. 
US politicians and popular culture recast Japan from diabolic enemy to infant 
democratic ally under Western tutelage and outright race hate yielded to the 
milder bigotry of superior paternalism, as Dower also notes.13 Emotive ethnic 
loathing existed but did not override power-political calculations and cannot 
explain ‘these intellectual and emotional gymnastics.’14 
 
It was not only within government that alternatives to a ‘war without mercy’ got 
a hearing. The agents of US psychological war (‘psywar’) believed America 
should aim to discredit a cause rather than annihilate an enemy people. The 
figures who designed the ‘mind war’ on Japan consciously articulated an 
alternative vision of victory than one of brute force. They tried to decode the 
mysteries of Japanese culture and unhinge its collective psychology. They used 
air-dropped leaflets, loudspeaker and radio broadcasts, magazines and news 
sheets to target combatants and the civil population, to erode their will and self-
belief, and offer an honourable way out. This, they believed, would save 
American lives and shorten the war.  
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This article revisits psywar in the Pacific. It focuses mainly on the Psychological 
Warfare Branch (PWB) that General Douglas MacArthur approved and began in 
September 1944 and was coordinated out of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA). 
The PWB got a late start, beginning when Douglas MacArthur created the PWB 
in June 1944.15 Yet it was the most intensive effort to weaponise cultural 
knowledge and penetrate enemy psychology for strategic ends.16 This analysis 
primarily examines MacArthur’s Military Secretary, Japanist and head of 
Psychological Warfare, Brigadier Bonner Fellers.17 In 1935, Fellers had written a 
prescient study, ‘Psychology of the Japanese Soldier’, that predicted Japanese 
tokkotai (suicidal ‘special-attack’) methods.18 Military Attaché in Egypt from 1940-
1942, Fellers moved to the Office of Strategic Services and then worked for 
Douglas MacArthur. He was the most influential theorist and practitioner on 
MacArthur’s staff, and he left the richest archive.   
 
This article adds to a growing body of work on Allied psychological warfare.19 It 
builds also on Haruo Iguchi’s work on the role of Fellers in American debate 
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over post-war Japan and the rewriting of the war’s history.20 And it follows 
Douglas Ford on wartime intelligence assessments and Allison Gilmore on 
psywar. Both Ford and Gilmore trace the evolution of American and Allied 
perceptions of the Japanese military with its strengths and weaknesses.21 Both 
qualify Dower’s argument, showing that the dynamic of hateful race war did not 
prevent these observers from developing increasingly sophisticated 
understandings. Unlike these authors, however, this article is concerned 
ultimately not with the accuracy of American assessments of Japan or the impact 
and reception of propaganda. Its main focus will be on the ideas that drove the 
project.  
 
I make three arguments. First, I show that the debate over the effectiveness of 
psywar cannot be fully resolved. Despite the best efforts of historians, the 
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effectiveness of this ‘psywar’ campaign is ultimately imprecise. Debate today 
reflects the ambiguities of debate at the time. Secondly, I argue that psychological 
warfare was an uneasy symbiosis of mythmaking and science, an ongoing 
tension between ideological vision and painstaking critical observation. Critical 
to my argument is the distinction between the scientific and mythological. By 
scientific in this context, I mean both a temperament and practice of obtaining 
evidence, refining assumptions and adjusting interpretations to feedback, using 
and testing hypotheses, and recognition of the provisional nature of results.22 By 
mythological, I mean the assertion of a symbolic structure of stories, invoked as 
historical but without regard for empirical investigation, that provides meaning 
and identity and in this case underpins political claims about Japan.23  
 
US observers shifted between mythmaking and dispassionate analysis according 
to different levels of war. At the tactical ‘combat’ level where the PWB appraised 
the IJA, the PWB increasingly developed a careful and balanced profile of the 
enemy. Here it challenged fictitious stereotypes and established that many 
Japanese troops were not stereotypically hardened warrior souls, and that they 
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were not bound by a traditionalist script, and that their culture was not one-
dimensional and static.  
 
At higher levels, propagandists erected mythologies of their own. They filled a 
vacuum of ignorance with a pre-existing ideology that coincided with American 
policymaking interests. As the US closed in physically on the Japanese 
homeland, psywar became increasingly the delivery system for an ambitious 
wartime ideology. More than a drive to demoralize Japan’s population and 
government, it saw itself as the spearhead of a bid to refine a brutal race war, to 
appeal to the liberal ‘good’ Japan, and to purify the emperor’s image. This helped 
America to reinvent its image of Japan and leave the merciless race struggle 
behind. 
 
I. Weighing the Impact of Psychological Warfare 
What was the impact of psywar? What was its significance? Did it work? 
Depending on context and national policy, it can be pursued with disparate aims. 
At war with Japan in Burma, Britain’s XIV Army and its Psychological War 
Division (PWD) concluded that the payoffs of psywar were modest. Japan could 
ultimately be vanquished ‘only through the physical elimination of its armed 
forces.’ Propaganda was only a minor supplement that could not deliver mass 
surrenders, given the ‘overwhelming evidence which suggested that the 
Japanese soldier was most likely to fight to the bitter end.’ General William 
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Slim’s headquarters gave it faint praise, describing its effects as ‘not 
inconsiderable.’ The reports of the PWD reckoned that only a tiny portion of the 
Japanese troops were impressed by leaflets.24 Psywar was an auxiliary activity 
that only softened the enemy before its military destruction.  
 
Their US counterparts hoped to attack the enemy’s will more profoundly.  
American propagandists were a heterogenous lot. But they were generally more 
ambitious in their aims for propaganda than the British.25 Fellers saw psywar as 
more than an arm of the war effort. It was part of a grander world-historical 
project to alter Japanese thinking, reconcile the Orient and Occident, and 
proclaim America’s idealistic war aims.26 American propaganda, which 
promised the emancipation of Japan’s conquered subjects, distanced itself from 
the central aim of Britain’s Far Eastern Liaison Office, the reconstitution of 
empire.27 It also claimed credit for the erosion of Japanese fanaticism, inducing 
enemy forces to surrender or desert. It goaded Japan’s navy into disastrous 
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attacks. It demoralised the civil population, brought on Japan’s surrender and 
peaceful capitulation, resulting in a bloodless post-war occupation. As Fellers 
wrote to his wife on 12 August 1945, after Nimitz and MacArthur ‘licked them’, 
the war was won by ‘the Atomic bomb – Air power – and Psychological 
Warfare.’28  
 
Months after its creation, the PWB and its sympathisers reported breakthroughs. 
By November 1944, 100 Japanese soldiers died in combat for every one that 
surrendered. By January, the ratio dropped to 60:1. Three months later, it fell to 
30:1. By July 1945, one Japanese soldier surrendered for every seven of his 
comrades killed.29 Reports, such as the Divisional one from Biak, speculated that 
a high proportion (75%) of Japanese surrendering troops ‘appeared to be 
influenced by leaflets in making up their minds to surrender.’30 And a 
sympathetic journalist judged that at Okinawa, where the US applied an intense 
propaganda campaign, the surrender of thousands refuted the idea that ‘nothing 
except cold steel could change the Japanese way of thinking.’31  
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But the extent of PWB’s success is controversial. Sceptics make two complaints. 
Firstly, US psywar trafficked in simplistic stereotypes, perpetuating the crude 
stereotyping and ethnocentrism that it was supposed to overcome. While Dower 
sympathises with Fellers, who as a Japanophile had some polished views, he 
lampoons other American Japanists for their eccentric visions. These were on 
display at their Manila Conference in May 1945, such as a proposal to paint 
Emperor Hirohito’s face on the side of Allied ships to dissuade suicide planes. 
He also lampoons the unsophisticated views of Colonel Sidney Mashbir, the 
head of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) as ‘unimpeded by 
coherence.’32 Dower complains that their view of Japan derived mostly not from 
contemporary intelligence but from older Western literature, and that it repeated 
mechanically a set of dubious assumptions. As we will see, while their 
observations of Japanese politics and national character lacked rigour, their 
military assessments turn out to be considerably more intricate and 
sophisticated, even if they were not always accurate.  
 
The second criticism is simple but powerful. This is that psywar largely did not 
work. It had little practical impact on the war, whether its conduct or its 
outcome. The intelligence personnel who tried to alter the character of the front 
line were ‘swimming upstream against a powerful current of mutual 
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bloodletting.’33  Contemporaries complained that psywar failed to make Japanese 
forces surrender en masse. The adversary was too wedded to a code of ‘death 
before dishonour.’ American GIs hated and feared their adversaries too much to 
moderate their behaviour. Their aversion to taking prisoners was fed by the 
Japanese practice of using surrender only as a feint for ambush.34 Psywar also 
suffered from having powerful opponents. Whereas MacArthur was a believer, 
there were doubters on his staff such as Colonel Charles Willoughby who 
deliberately delayed operations. Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, and Nimitz’s 
Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Charles E. McMorris, regarded the project as 
impractical.35  
 
Even senior backers of the propaganda campaign were guarded in their support. 
Under-Secretary of War Robert Patterson cautioned in June 1945 that ‘the 
number of prisoners we are taking in the Pacific war is still small, both in the 
aggregate and in comparison to the number of Germans taken under similar 
conditions. Also, psychological warfare is effective only when our physical force 
and the courage of our own men are making obvious advance in battle toward 
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the destruction of Japan.’36 The Pacific campaign suffered from comparison with 
the higher surrender rate of other Axis forces. Propagandists themselves 
accepted that they could ‘proceed no faster than winning armies…Its function is 
to exploit military victories.’37 
 
These arguments are reflected in recent historiography. Clayton Laurie argues 
that while some gains were made in the campaigns of late 1944 and 1945, these 
were marginal at best. As well as the mutually reinforcing reluctance of Japanese 
to capitulate and American reluctance to take prisoners, these difficulties were 
compounded by organizational chaos and the lack of overarching coordination 
between multiple overlapping agencies; the lack of linguistic competence and 
comprehensive information; the logistical difficulties in broadcasting messages 
across a vast distance; and general hostility to civilian participation.38 The 
realities of the conflict meant there were great practical as well as cultural 
obstacles to surrender. Even troops who wanted to surrender needed the ability 
to escape and reach enemy lines, which was not always possible.  
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Richard Frank is also unimpressed. He argues that despite valiant efforts, the 
raw statistics suggest propaganda only dented Japanese fighting spirit. Even 
when propaganda seemed to succeed at Luzon, where over 7000 Japanese were 
captured, the total garrison had been 287,000, a rate of surrenders that was only 
2.5%, hardly higher than the typical rate of between 1 and 3% in earlier ‘ferocious 
battles.’ While 19,000 soldiers were captured in the south-west Pacific, this was 
only a small share of the approximately 600,000 in that theatre.39 And as Laurie 
argues, the overall proportion of Japanese surrenders at Okinawa, where a 
strong propaganda campaign was waged, was slight. In a garrison of possibly 
120,000 men, once we exclude Korean and Formosan labourers, 7400 Japanese 
soldiers surrendered, a surrender rate of roughly 6%.40 This was an increase from 
previous rates, but fell short of a qualitative shift in the character of the fighting. 
Given that America sustained approximately 50,000 casualties before attaining 
this low minority of surrenders, it could be reasonably speculated that psywar 
would not have been sufficiently effective to offset horrific American losses in an 
assault on a far greater scale on the Japanese home islands.    
 
While psywar mostly failed to induce mass surrender, this critique should be 
qualified. There is a ‘glass half full, glass half empty’ quality to the debate. What 
looks to some like a meagre aggregate rise in surrenders relative to the total 
                                                 
39 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York, Random House, 
1999, 2001 edn.), pp.71-72 n. (Frank does not number the relevant footnote). 
40 Laurie, ‘Psychological Warfare in the Pacific’, pp.118-119. 
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number of enemy combatants, looks to others like an impressive increase relative 
to the number of previous surrenders. To focus only on the ‘numbers game’ of 
surrender counting is reductive. Gilmore, in a careful and sophisticated study, 
shows that not only was the rate of surrenders steadily increasing, but that 
captured Japanese documents reveal a broader and more diffuse set of effects. 
These included desertion, suicide, or a general lowering of resistance and 
fighting spirit, with more combatants refusing orders to attack.41 Propaganda 
had enough impact to make Japanese field commanders worry about its 
influence on the men. This echoes an argument of the time, that psywar was 
primarily about ‘demoralizing the enemy. If we can make them fight less hard it 
will make the job easier…[and] the number of Japanese who have committed 
suicide because of propaganda is very great and very real.’42  
 
Even a small number of surrenders could yield valuable tactical intelligence that 
reduced US losses. Just one prisoner could be a ‘force multiplier.’ Because 
Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated not to be taken alive and many believed 
that surrender would leave them pariahs from their society, and because they 
were not trained to resist interrogation or handle imprisonment, many were 
eager to please. As a result, captives often spoke freely, regarded themselves as 
                                                 
41
 Gilmore, You Can’t Fight Tanks With Bayonets. 
42 Major Anderson, GHQ Sixth Army, at Manila Conference. BF Box 41, Folder 6: Manila 
Conference, p.55.  
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‘reborn’ and cooperated extensively.43 This benefit was strategically significant. 
The US organized its war effort partly around the principle of minimizing its 
own casualties, opting for a capital intensive rather than manpower intensive 
strategy, to sustain public support and guard against a reversion to populist 
isolationism.44 For example, propagandists estimated that in the Philippine 
Liberation Campaign, for each 5.3 individual enemies who were counted dead, 
America suffered one casualty. If America had been obliged to fight the 12,181 
enemy troops who surrendered, it might have taken over 2000 more casualties. If 
we accept casualty-limitation as a contribution to US goals, psywar looks more 
successful. America politically wanted to avoid to fight a protracted land war of 
annihilation, so minimising losses mattered.45 
                                                 
43 MacArthur Memorial Archive, RG3, Box 119: ATIS report, no. 76, p.33: 'Self-immolation as a 
factor in Japanese military psychology': ‘…the typical Japanese soldier is not security conscious. 
Instructions to kill themselves automatically precludes training in security after capture. In 
consequence, the Japanese PW usually talks freely, and with little idea of the quantity or value of 
the information he discloses. Secondly, the very factor of hopelessness with which the Japanese 
PW views his position tends to break down the resistance which PsW of other countries exhibit 
toward interrogation. The Japanese PW usually considers himself a hopeless man cast up on the 
face of the earth, a dead man in theory, a nearly so in fact. His ties to Japan are severed forever, in 
his belief.’ As Fellers noted, ‘we want the prisoners because they all talk freely…intelligence 
saves lives.’ BF Box 41, Folder 1: Letter, Fellers to Capt. William R. Beard, 17 January 1945. 
44 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, 2005 edn.), p.7; Kent 
Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration  (New York, Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1982), pp.74-75. 
45 Defenders of psywar could use this argument to set the bar very low. As William Vatcher, who 
had been on the staff of Admiral Nimitz recalled, ‘The PW Section believed it to be a grave 
misconception to hold the notion that to defeat Japan it would be necessary to kill every Japanese. 
Policy based on that notion would be extremely costly in American lives. According to estimates, 
the mortality ratio in earlier operations was about six Japanese to one American; on Iwo it had 
been about five to one. In view of this high proportion, the PW Section argued that there was 
nothing to lose by attempting to apply propaganda ideas. In the thinking of the section, its 
attempts would be more than worth while even if only one American life would be saved by its 
efforts.’ William H. Vatcher, ‘Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese in the Central Pacific’ 
(Unpublished Dissertation, Hoover Institution Library, 1946). 
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How to appraise the performance of psywar divided practitioners at the time. 
The Office of War Information, Foreign Morale Analysis Division, claimed in 
April 1944 that a psywar campaign could increase battlefield surrenders.46 Yet 
the Anglo-American Outline Plan of May 1944 pointed to a broad array of effects, 
including the encouraging of dissent by occupied groups and the promotion of 
dissent between Japan and Germany.47 At the Manila Conference of 7-8 May 
1945, some participants stressed surrender as the ultimate aim, others 
emphasised increased intelligence, and others general enemy demoralization and 
the lowering of combat performance.48 Psywar advocates had an interest in 
preventing surrender being the sole criterion for success. ‘Contrary to popular 
belief’, insisted the Military Secretary’s Report of 10 March 1945, ‘surrender is not 
the primary objective of ‘Combat Propaganda.’ Seventy five per cent of PWB 
leaflets are designed to accelerate the cracking of Jap morale.’49 This did not stop 
Fellers from arguing forcefully that propaganda increased surrenders. The 
measurability and purpose of the enterprise were never finally agreed.  
 
                                                 
46 Cited in Dower War Without Mercy, pp.136.  
47 BF, Box 3, Folder 4: Combined Chiefs of Staff, ‘Anglo-American Outline Plan for Psychological 
Warfare Against Japan’ 21 May 1944. 
48 BF Box 41, Folder 6: ‘Conference on Psychological Warfare Against Japan’, pp.37-39: Captain 
Claiborne sceptically argued that ‘With all our efforts we are still not getting many prisoners to 
come in voluntarily’, whereas Colonel White of the Sixth Army replied ‘The more I see of this 
game, the more I think that prisoners aren’t the big goal, so long as we get intelligence.’; Major 
Anders, GHQ Sixth Army, countered that the ‘primary mission’ of psywar was ‘demoralizing the 
enemy’ and ‘make them fight less hard.’  
49 BF Box 4 Folder 3: US Army Southwest Pacific Area General Head Office of Military Secretary, 
Report, ‘Psychological Warfare Reactions and Developments’ No.7, 10 March 1945, p.5. 
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While we should be open to the broader effects of psychological war, some 
ambitious boasts of the propagandists will not survive interrogation. The PWB 
attempted to shame General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the ‘Tiger of Malaya’, to 
commit hara-kiri, a sustained attempt at cultural manipulation which 
demonstrably failed, as Yamashita was tried and executed in February 1946.50 
Consider also the opinion of Mashbir, that PWB taunted and provoked Japan 
into the Leyte battle on 24 October 1944, where its fleet was annihilated.51 If this 
motivated Japan’s disastrous naval assault, it must have been very secret. 
Admiral Soemu Toyoda, who commanded the Sho Go (‘Victory Operation’) 
operation, did not mention US propaganda in his post-war testimony to the 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. His stated rationale was strategic interest 
rather than honour or emotion.52 There is also a chronological flaw in the 
‘provocation theory.’ Japan’s operation, to mount a last-ditch decisive battle with 
dispersed assets, was planned from June 1944, after the fall of the Marianas, 
confirmed in an Imperial Headquarters directive to Commander in Chief 
                                                 
50 BF Box 4, Folder 1: As Fellers instructed, ‘call for hara-kiri by Yamashita because of his failure.’ 
Letter Fellers to Lt. Col. Woodall Greene, 21 December 1944. They were still attempting this 
theme in March 1945, mocking Yamashita for being ‘prodigal with the lives of his own men, but 
apparently very sparing of his own…Include reference to Yamashita’s obligations under the 
Bushido code.’ BF Box 3, Folder 6: ‘Philippine Hour Plan’, 2-8 March 1945. 
51 ‘Report on Psychological Warfare Against Japan, Southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945’, p.8, 
footnotes * & ** (sic), Fellers Papers Box 41, Folder 7; Reportedly, this had been conceived by 
Commodore Tarbuck, who felt that if radio programs goaded the admirals, the fleet would be 
ordered out; BF Box 41, Folder 1: Letter, Fellers to Elmer Davis, Officer of War Information, 1 
November 1944, ‘We know we have lowered Japanese morale, and we believe we may have 
helped to needle the Japanese Admirals into their recent disastrous fleet action.’  
52 He claimed the attack was a necessary gamble to prevent the route to the south being broken 
and supply to the navy being cut off: United States Strategic Bombing Survey (The Campaigns of 
the Pacific War, Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Washington, 
United States Govt Printing Office, 1946), Interrogation Nav NO. 75 USSBS NO. 378, 13-14 
November 1945, pp.313-327, p.317. 
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Combined Fleet dated 21 July 1944, and established by 26 July, with the defence 
of the Philippines named ‘Sho I.’53 America’s decision to liberate the Philippines 
was only confirmed at the Honolulu Conference of July 1944, and not officially 
until mid-September. Japan’s decision to attack predated the first American 
broadcasts in the autumn, and so was not caused by them.  
 
The propagandists did have one significant strategic ‘win.’ Practitioner and 
theorist Paul Linebarger claimed that American propaganda accelerated Japan’s 
collapse. When Japan offered to surrender after two atomic bomb attacks, B-29s 
carried leaflets to all parts of Japan, showing the text of the offer. ‘This act alone 
would have made it almost impossibly difficult for the Japanese government to 
whip its people back into frenzy for suicidal prolongation of war.’54 There is 
some substance to this. Kōichi Kido, Japan’s Lord Privy Seal and the Emperor’s 
close advisor, personally obtained a leaflet and advised Hirohito that the public’s 
knowledge of the surrender offer endangered the throne and that he should act 
                                                 
53 James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1947), pp.7-9; Alfred Castle, ‘President Roosevelt and General MacArthur at the Honolulu 
Conference of 1944’, The Hawaiian Journal of History 38 (2004), pp.165-173, p.173. 
54 Paul Linebarger Psychological Warfare (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp.103-104. 
As he went on, ‘The Japanese texts were checked between Washington and Hawaii by radio 
photograph and cryptotelephone; the plates were put into the presses at Saipan; the big planes 
took off…It took America three and a half years to reach that point, but we reached it. Nowhere 
else in history can there be found an instance of so many people being given so decisive a 
message, all at the same time, at the very dead-point between war and peace.’ 
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immediately, thus leading to the Rescript of surrender.55 These leaflets probably 
accelerated the Japanese surrender and made it irreversible. 
 
Psywar probably had a generally dispiriting effect on its target audience and was 
of some value in terms of intelligence gains and casualty minimisation in the 
final six months of the war. Beyond that, effects are hard to compute precisely. 
The causal linkages are too difficult to trace, and the evidence is too incomplete. 
We have no representative contemporary record of the inner convictions of the 
Japanese combatants at the time they deserted or committed suicide. Nor do we 
have any reliable way of measuring how far surrendering troops were driven by 
the messages they read or heard.56 Moreover, most documentary proof of the 
successes of psywar was collected and interpreted by psychological warriors 
themselves.57 They were promoting their craft to a sometimes hostile audience. 
Fellers, who headed the interviews, ‘could not help being prejudiced. This is 
clearly revealed in the interviews done by him.’58 Some surviving Japanese 
                                                 
55 Robert Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1954), pp.205-
206. 
56 As an example of this ambiguity, Major Hall of the US Eighth Army, reported to the Manila 
Conference (p.39) on operations South of Luzon in Cebu City: ‘In the night they pulled out – an 
estimated 5,000. What would have happened, we asked G-2, if they had stayed in that area? We 
would have been fighting there a year from now. Why did they pull out? No one knew. They had 
caves up there, with all the conveniences of home- electric lights, blankets, rations, clothing, and 
supplies that ranged from face powder to tons of rice. Had we possibly affected their morale a 
little? No one can tell.’  
57 BF Box 41, Folder 6: these interviews are recorded in Annex 26 to Report on Psychological 
Warfare, ‘Reaction of Japanese to Psychological Warfare.’ The interviewers were Fellers and Lt. 
Commander S.C. Bartlett. 
58 William Henry Vatcher Papers (WV), Hoover Institution, Box 15 ‘World War, 1950-1953 
Propaganda, American Japanese Forces’ draft manuscript, ‘Chapter XV Japanese Homeland: 
Evaluation.’ 
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officials and officers did testify after the war that American propaganda had 
succeeded. But this retrospective source is not above suspicion. In the shadow of 
war crimes trials, they were probably tempted to tell their interrogators what 
they wanted to hear. 
 
If we cannot reach any firmer conclusions about the effects of psywar in the 
Pacific, we can develop a stronger grasp of the ideas that drove it. How did the 
observers observe? 
 
II. Psychological Warfare: the dynamics of cultural observation 
Pyswar was cross-cultural analysis. So to understand how it worked, we need an 
understanding of how the PWB explicitly or implicitly understood culture. There 
are different concepts of culture, and we can see two versions within the wartime 
writings of American propagandists. Culture can be approached as a static, 
bounded, primordial, homogenous, and separate property of an observed people 
who are ‘other.’59 At its most aggressive, this view conceives others as 
mechanistic rule followers, slaves to tradition or timeless national character. In 
concrete terms, there was the widespread notion that the Japanese fought 
intensely, were suicidal and never surrendered because as a race they were 
driven by savage impulses, placed little value on life, or were fanatics from an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
59 On these discrepant models of culture as applied in another wartime context, see Keith Brown, 
‘All They Understand is Force’: Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom’ American 
Anthropologist 110:4 (2008), pp.443-453. 
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alien social world, and that Japanese totalitarianism was not historically 
contingent but inherent, rooted in their national psyche and past.  
 
Culture can also be wrought as a more dynamic, conflicted, instrumental and 
interactive phenomenon. In this approach, culture is not reducible to tidy and 
logical systems, or fixed patterns. The changing external environment matters as 
much as internal drives. Societies are not separate and hermetically sealed from 
cross-cultural influences like trade, war, migration, and borrowings of ideas or 
materials. Culture in this view is ‘a sphere of practical activity shot through by 
wilful action, power relations, struggle, contradiction, and change.’60 This 
approach would offer alternative explanations for Japanese military behaviour: 
that, contrary to some essentialist visions, Japan’s hyper-nationalist wartime 
ideology and neo-feudalist ‘family-state’ ethos was a relatively new political 
force begun through coercion, propaganda and military indoctrination only 
decades earlier by the Meiji oligarchs;61 they avoided surrender partly because of 
the merciless nature of the battlefield in the Pacific and American killings of 
                                                 
60 As described by William H. Sewell, Jr. ‘The Concept(s) of Culture’ in Victoria E. Bonnell and 
Lynn Hunt (eds.) Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture 
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Benedict, see Elson Boles, ‘Ruth Benedict’s Japan: the Benedictions of Imperialism’ Dialectical 
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prisoners; there were alternative strains of thought within Japan that could be 
appealed to; and there were different ‘types’ of Japanese combatants within the 
IJA.  
 
The psywar program emerged out of a national intellectual context and 
institutional subculture. ‘National character’ studies of mass behaviour were 
prominent in the American social sciences in that era. Interwar theorists of 
propaganda, such as Harold Lasswell and Leonard Doob, and public opinion 
theorists such as Walter Lippmann argued that the US must professionally 
exploit the mental dimension of warfare. Public opinion polling had begun in the 
1930’s and university psychology departments took up quantitative methods to 
gauge responses to war news and propaganda.62 The psywar campaign drew 
force from an optimism that whole societies could be ‘known’ as discrete, 
coherent systems through systematic analysis, and that the enemy’s mental 
world could be effectively manipulated. Fellers himself had been formed in this 
tradition. In January 1943, he wrote of the Soviet Union’s inability to sustain a 
long war, that the ‘emotional Slavic temperament has neither the stability nor the 
steadfastness of purpose which is to be found in that of the Teuton and the 
Anglo-Saxon.’63 Subsequent events on the Eastern Front throw doubt on such 
                                                 
62 On this context, see Finch, ‘Psychological Propaganda’ Armed Forces & Society, p.370. 
63 BF, Box 15 Folder 17: Letter, Fellers to ‘Col. Donovan’, 25 January 1943. Similarly, the hunt for 
Japanese ‘national character’ influenced Captain Ellis Zacharias while he worked as a naval 
intelligence officer in pre-war Japan. Zacharias read various Western accounts of Japanese 
personality ‘along scientific lines’, such as Walter Dening, Captain Frank Brinkley and D.C. 
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forecasts, but the concept of a national personality was a powerful one carried 
over to the Pacific War. 
 
The war with Japan further stimulated the boom of ‘whole culture’ studies. 
Cultural-anthropological studies of warring nations were sponsored by the U.S. 
government.64 Fellers and his colleagues pursued racial ‘knowledge’ and a 
‘profound’ grasp of enemy psychology as the key to unmaking the political 
conditioning of militarism.65 They defined it as the ‘military application of the 
science which analyses, predicts and influences the behaviour of the people.’66 
Architects of American psywar took pride in their new craft as a robust science, 
reporting that Watson Davis, the director of Science Service, identified the ‘use of 
psychological warfare methods in hastening the Japanese unconditional 
surrender’ alongside antibiotics and nuclear power as one of the ten most 
important scientific advances of 1945.67  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Holtom. He later claimed that these cultural observations assisted his wartime radio broadcasts 
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66 BF, Box 41 Folder 6: ‘Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan’ 12 April 
1945, Annex 6 to Final Report, Foreward. 
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While they were proud of their scientific credentials, they did not apply a 
scientific temperament evenly. As a general pattern, the further they moved from 
the interpretation of Japanese military behaviour on the battlefield towards the 
nature and politics of Japanese society, the more they abandoned careful 
analysis, and espoused a largely unsubstantiated ideology and fell prey to rash 
generalisations. The more they moved away from their analysis of the ordinary 
Japanese soldier, the more the evidence-based attitude faded and was replaced 
by an almost faith-based vision of Japan. By the time of the Tokyo war crimes 
trials, they had abandoned dispassionate analysis, and created a convenient 
public ideology that underpinned consent to the new order. This mythology was 
a victor’s code and contained several elements: that the Japanese people were 
innocent victims, uncontaminated by war guilt and that they were coerced and 
manipulated into supporting the war; that they universally were reverently 
devoted to the Emperor; that their Emperor was a powerless symbol monarch 
who strived for an honourable peace; that shame and honour were almost 
irresistible drivers of Japanese behaviour. This ideology offered Japan the 
comfort that only a small defeated clique was responsible for its war and war 
crimes, and conferred legitimacy on the new post-war order. 
 
To help understand this, we might plot their perceptions of Japan along a 
‘tactical-strategic spectrum.’ There were different levels at which cultural 
analysis took place. At lower levels, PWB’s concerns were immediate and 
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practical. They asked how to lower the morale of Japanese fighting forces, how to 
get Japanese combatants to give up, kill themselves or desert, and how to predict 
their combat behaviour. In this endeavour, they had access to a wide body of raw 
material, such as interrogations of prisoners, captured documents, diaries and 
letters. Fundamental in this was ATIS, the Allied Translator and Interpreter 
Section. It was the most important source of intelligence and grew into a mass 
organisation that translated captured enemy documents, interrogated POWs, 
and undertook specialist topic research. Thus analysis of the IJA took place in a 
context of intimate exposure to fresh evidence, contact with real Japanese 
combatants, an explicit recognition of pre-existing assumptions and critical 
engagement with them, and a pressure to form accurate and useful views of the 
enemy for tangible results.  
 
This tactical-strategic spectrum is not absolute. For example, views of Japanese 
military behaviour differed according to whether they concerned elites or the 
common soldier. Their concept of the ‘shame-based’ and ‘suicidal’ Japanese high 
command was more based on crude stereotyping than assessments of the 
Japanese soldiers’ personality types. And to identify a contrast between more 
mythological and more scientific approaches is not to suggest that the two were 
necessarily entirely separate or that analysis existed in an ideological vacuum. A 
reasoned interpretation of Japanese behaviour could still entail assumptions 
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about ‘national character.’ But there were contrasting temperaments that powered 
American analysis. This is an approximate model that fits most cases. 
 
In their diagnosis of the enemy at the level of combat propaganda, the psywarists 
challenged the view of Japanese military culture as a homogenous fanatical bloc. 
They recognized different personality types and tried to form a more layered 
profile of the IJA. They differentiated Japanese military behaviour over time. 
They identified and tried to exploit competing Japanese soldierly traditions. 
Additionally, they recognized the dynamic and symbiotic nature of military 
behaviour, seeking to reform American military conduct. Though they did not 
always develop an intricate view of Japanese armed forces, they developed a 
more sophisticated model of culture. 
 
This trend of increasing sophistication can be broken down into a number of 
patterns. Firstly, there is differentiation, the attempt to move beyond notions of 
Japanese militarism as a timeless and all-embracing monolith. Increasingly, the 
PWB distinguished between different militarisms, and identified growing 
divisions within the IJA which could potentially be exploited. Gilmore shows 
that by late 1944, they built their propaganda on studies of Japanese diaries that 
distinguished different personality types, with only a minority of 10% having the 
fanatical samurai profile, the rest ranging from ‘men of action’ to ‘intellectuals’ to 
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malcontents.68 This growing insight can also be seen in the propaganda they 
developed to attack the record of the Japanese officer corps. The purpose of this 
material was ‘To explode the myth that Japanese leaders are a God-chosen class 
embodying the highest ideals of the Japanese warrior code’ and ‘to show the 
deliberate and flagrant manner in which the ‘Nogi tradition’ has been perverted. 
For in violating this tradition present day Japanese leaders have, in effect, 
violated the Meiji Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors – the Bible of the Japanese 
Warrior.’ In this literature, they accused Japanese officers of betraying the 
heritage and desecrating the honourable warrior code embodied by historical 
figures such as General Nogi Maresuke with his ‘splendid spirit’. Thus they 
contrasted Nogi’s sacrifice of his own son at Hill 203 in the Russo-Japanese war, 
with tales of officers abusing their class privilege, hoarding food or distributing it 
unfairly, and their ‘free, luxurious and libertine tendencies.’ It also quoted from 
Japan’s Vice-Minister of War in October 1943, who issued a memorandum 
against senior officers applying to transfer home, or avoiding action by cutting 
telephone wire or getting intoxicated, or those illegally returning to Japan to see 
their mistresses. It contrasted the ‘base spirit’ of current officers with their heroic 
forbears.69 In contrast to the stereotype of the fanatical self-sacrificing 
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69 BF Box 14, Folder 4: ‘The Nogi Tradition Past and Present’ Special Report No.1, 3 May 1945; BF 
Box 1, Folder 2: Leaflet, ‘General Nogi.’ 
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personality, they accused the officers of being the opposite - self-serving 
materialists. This literature attempted to recast Japanese officers as a perverse 
new elite, who were distinct from and antithetical towards the common soldier. 
The assertion that ‘the Army seems to have discarded all good points in the 
samurai code while retaining all the bad ones’ recognised change.70 The Japanese 
soldier could be moved by ordinary and material concerns – such as the 
misallocation of food, logistical failures and shortages, or the misbehaviour of his 
leaders – that eroded his sense of national obligation, and that his attitude to 
authority could alter. This was heightened by the military environment. 
MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign and Allied air and naval power cut off 
many troops in isolated territory and denied them escape, resupply or 
reinforcements, conditions of material deterioration and hunger that sapped 
morale.  
 
To be sure, this picture itself contained mythological elements of its own. It 
entailed an idealist reading of Meiji-era officers and effectively shifted all blame 
from the common soldier to the subordinate commander. It was also problematic 
as it was not always coherent. The psywarists veered between accusing Japanese 
officers of being cynically self-indulgent, and then trying to get them to kill 
themselves out of shame. Equally, it is evidence that American observers had 
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progressed beyond the view of Japanese as a homogenous fanatical bloc. By 
recognising historical discontinuities and layers of conflict within the armed 
forces, it broke through the mytho-historical view of Japanese military history as 
an unbroken story, and the army as an undifferentiated unity, ideas that had 
been propagated both by the Japanese state and in hostile Western rhetoric. And 
it was built upon an observed record of soldiers’ grievances that prisoners had 
communicated. 
 
Propagandists also recognised the constitutive and symbiotic nature of the 
battlefield, the reality that the practices of war are partly created by the relation 
and interaction between different animate bodies. This is seen in their 
understanding of Japanese surrender-aversion. The enemy was reluctant or 
unable to surrender not only because of interior cultural-political reasons of 
shame and taboo, or because of military indoctrination that America would 
terribly torture its captives. It was also because of the more brute fact that 
surrendering was a dangerous business in the Pacific war. Because American 
forces often killed surrendering enemies through fear and hostility, fighting to 
the death could be a rational reaction. In turn, this reinforced the militarist 
ideology that rejected surrender. In this light, the PWB developed a critique of 
prisoner-killing and brutality as counter-productive. As executive officer of PWB 
Woodall Greene wrote to Fellers in December 1944, ‘Fear of being killed is one of 
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the outstanding reasons for so few PWs being taken.’71 They noticed a self-
fulfilling quality to the American image of the fanatical Japanese soldier. In 
January 1945, Capt. William Beard argued to Fellers that the mercilessness of the 
front was created partly by images propagated in America’s press, which shaped 
preconceptions of U.S. combatants.72 US troops arrived in theatre convinced that 
the Jap would fight unto death and was thoroughly averse to surrender, and in 
turn this made them reluctant to take surrender seriously. In connection with this 
point, American psywar was part of a wider effort not only to alter the mindset 
and behaviour of the enemy, but to re-educate American armed forces about the 
value of propaganda and the payoffs of restraint and mercy on the battlefield. As 
one pamphlet produced by the PWB instructed, ‘We haven’t the troops, the 
resources or the time to kill them all…our short-cut to victory is through 
Japanese surrender.’73  
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Cultures are contradictory and conflicted. While a fanatical determination to 
fight and die rather than surrender was a powerful concept within the militarist 
ideology, American propagandists appealed to other traditions that could 
counter-act it. In particular, they identified the cherished ideals of life-
preservation in the mental universe of Japan. Namely, this was the ethic that 
Japanese men must preserve their family line and had a responsibility to their 
ancestors and their family, and to post-war reconstruction. To minimize the 
stigma that came with surrender, the PWB portrayed futile death ‘as a violation 
of the traditional Japanese obligation to carry on the family line and serve one’s 
country in the future.’74 A propaganda leaflet during the Okinawa battle 
proclaimed that ‘suicide also leaves a young man without sons to carry on his 
name. Do you want to be a man without a family line?’75 ATIS, the leading 
source of intelligence for combat propaganda, produced a report in 1944 on ‘Self-
immolation as a factor in Japanese military psychology.’ This recognised that a 
proportion of the enemy would resist the cultural forces which ‘press down upon 
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the Japanese soldier.’ Japanese troops might be animated by other impulses than 
the cult of death. These included the basic desire to live, alienation from the 
officer corps, and even the desire for later revenge. Poor morale and 
dissatisfaction with commanders sometimes made soldiers more restive and 
unwilling to follow tradition blindly. ‘The natural urge to live sometimes proves 
stronger than the compulsions produced by the Japanese system. With every 
Allied success, exploitation of the failure of Japanese to fulfil their responsibilities 
becomes a more potent propaganda weapon. Some Japanese soldiers are already 
talking of revenge against their own leaders.’76 In particular, it recommended 
that the US direct its propaganda to help overcome Japanese fear of mistreatment 
by Allied troops. Japanese prisoners helped devise these messages, and 
numerous leaflets conveyed this theme. All this suggests that US analysts were 
gradually evolving a richer and non-deterministic view of the IJA, portraying the 
enemy as capable of resisting social pressures, choosing amongst competing 
traditions and altering its behaviour.  
 
These impressions fed and were fed by a sense of the enemy’s common humanity. 
‘Like every human creature, the Japanese soldier, at heart, would much rather 
live than die.’77 A similar logic underpinned the Anglo-American Outline Plan 
for Psychological Warfare Against Japan, approved by the Combined Chiefs of 
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Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1944. ‘Despite his indoctrination, the 
regimented fighting man of Japan is fundamentally human and has the primary 
instincts of self-preservation and the desire to live a normal life.’78 This was not 
an egalitarian attitude. Psywarists believed the Japanese were in many ways 
inferior. Indeed, they were confident that they could succeed because they 
believed the Japanese were particularly flawed and susceptible to a ‘war of 
nerves.’ Fellers argued that American ingenuity could act upon Japan’s malleable 
thought patterns. As he wrote, ‘The Nip is now making a determined effort to 
hang on to Leyte. He is tough spiritually and physically but he is a sucker 
mentally.’79 Celebrated broadcaster and linguist Captain Ellis Zacharias believed 
that ‘moral stamina’ was the Japanese’ ‘Achilles heel.’80 US soldiers were 
superior because of their intellect and superior leadership, and it was therefore 
necessary to encourage restraint from hatred in order not to lose these 
advantages.81 In an inversion of the view that it was harder to break the will of 
Japanese troops than other Axis forces, Fellers believed that they were 
succeeding in the Pacific War whereas the mind war in Europe was inferior. In 
December 1944, he deemed the propaganda campaign against Germany a 
‘horrible failure’, claiming that its threats to the German people made them 
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‘united as never before, and it appears all will go out fighting.’82 This was also 
mistaken.83 But Fellers’ realisation that many Japanese might want to survive the 
war and were not necessarily suicidal automatons is striking at a time when 
these images were rampant in wartime discourse. 
 
Underlying these insights about the complexities, contradictions and 
multiplicities of culture, is a pattern of self-criticism amongst American 
observers. In their analysis of the enemy at the battlefield level, they were in 
touch with actual Japanese combatants, and were engaged in ongoing attempts 
to correct failures of propaganda, to overcome linguistic and stylistic errors of 
earlier material, to recognise the important subtleties in selection of words, to be 
sensitive to audience, reception and the material context in which ideas are 
formed. A fine example is the decision in January 1945 to alter leaflets and 
replace the Japanese words for ‘I surrender’, laden with stigma, with ‘I Cease 
Resistance.’ This was done in consultation with Japanese prisoners of war.84 It 
reflects an attention to detail, and recognition of the power of language and that 
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the enemy could have similar motivations on the battlefield while mediating 
experience through a different vocabulary. We can discern a meticulous process 
of self-criticism, learning and adaptation. 
 
Ultimately, this achievement did not remove brutality from the war. It did not 
lead to the mass surrenders that were hoped for. But it is evidence that the 
Americans most responsible for analysing the enemy did make a considerable 
attempt to inject a measure of discriminating insight into the ‘war without 
mercy.’ When we turn to their visions of Japanese homeland society, however, 
painstaking analysis yields to mythmaking.   
 
III Psychological Warfare and Mythmaking 
 
As the war progressed, American psywar entered a new phase, switching its 
attention more intensively from ‘combat’ or tactical operations directed at 
Japanese troops to broadcasting towards the homeland. From bases close to 
Japan, they sent messages via shortwave radio to the Japanese home islands and 
dropped millions of leaflets via land and carrier based planes. Psywar had 
‘jumped into the inland sea’ to invade Japan itself. This created a different 
context for their ‘knowledge’ of the enemy. The subject matter of the Japanese 
homeland was more remote and less familiar, the political power of symbolism 
was more seductive (in particular the drive to absolve the emperor to ensure 
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post-war stability), and opportunities were far fewer to test and correct 
preconceptions. Consequently, as US propagandists moved from the battlefield 
towards assessments of Japanese military leadership, society and high politics, 
they became mythmakers, reinventing Japan as much as they faithfully 
interpreted it. They projected onto the enemy a powerful set of preconceived 
generalizations, half-truths and fantasies. These included notions of the 
superstitious and malleable Japanese mind, the suicidal military elite, and the 
image of the innocent and captive emperor. This was because they lacked 
information, filled their vacuum of knowledge with ideology, were influenced by 
policy interests, and wanted to justify psywar itself. In turn, this exercise 
supplied a useful set of ideas on which America’s post-war policies could be 
built. In particular, it helped to establish in American eyes that the Japanese were 
childlike innocents duped by militarists, and that Japanese liberalism was 
authentic and could be revived under the throne and American power.  
 
At the high political level, the psywarists were interpreting in a vacuum of 
knowledge. They were less well informed than they were at the military level. In 
most cases, their exposure to Japan was limited. There was a shortage of 
qualified language interpreters. Only a small percentage of Nisei, second 
generation Japanese Americans, knew much Japanese.85 Fellers’ own background 
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reading was mostly limited to two authorities, Lafcadio Hearn (whose Japan: An 
Attempt at Interpretation was written in 1904) and Col. Sidney Mashbir, who 
Fellers described as the Army’s ‘foremost student of Japanese psychology’86 and 
who was fluent in Japanese, but who had not been in Japan since 1926. Most of 
the literature that Fellers and his colleagues used to built their interpretations of 
the homeland was received, secondary literature that long predated the war 
itself. The Office of War Information that generated wartime academics studies 
did not have access to wide-ranging evidence about and from contemporary 
Japan. America’s most influential wartime Japanists in this endeavour, like 
Geoffrey Gorer, Weston La Barre and Ruth Benedict were nouveaux Japonistes 
with little or no direct contact with Japan. Benedict did not speak or read 
Japanese, had never been to or studied Japan until given her assignment by the 
Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the OWI.87 This is a telling contrast to the 
rich fund of material that ATIS had to work with at the front line. 
 
This overall atmosphere did not encourage attention to the complexities and 
heterogeneity of Japan. It is well-established in intelligence studies that while 
information is not necessarily a guarantee of robust analysis, an information 
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vacuum can be one condition that encourages analysts to project pre-existing 
assumptions onto the subject uncritically.88 This is not to claim that they brought 
no preconceptions to their study of the IJA. They did. But they made them 
explicit and tested them, whereas they indulged them in their analysis of 
Japanese society.89  
 
Moreover, they had strong ideas to project. Two interlocking ideas were central. 
First, the strict separation between the ‘good Japanese’ and the innocent, pacifist 
symbol monarch on one hand, and the guilty militarists on the other such as 
General Hideki Tōjō. The military clique had misled and coerced the emperor 
and his people.90 Second, US propaganda also expressed an enduring faith in an 
underlying Japanese liberalism, averring that it was driven underground by 
militarists,91 and that one of America’s goals was to liberate Japanese liberalism 
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from its feudal overlords. Fellers averred that Japan could be psychologically 
demilitarised and that there could be a ‘mental metamorphosis’92 and 
democratisation through the emperor’s monarchical authority. In his September 
1945 memorandum to MacArthur, he claimed that America’s objectives in Japan 
include ‘removal of obstacles to democratic tendencies.’93 Such ideas took on a 
highly stark form at the hands of the propagandists, and proved convenient for 
American policy.  
 
When it came to their visions of Japan, propagandists were not all disinterested 
observers. Sidney Mashbir, for example, helped organise the Pan Pacific Society 
in 1923, a group of self-styled cosmopolitan men against militarists. The 
American-Japanese Koji Ariyoshi, a specialist in psywar who was part of 
America’s liaison with Mao’s Chinese Headquarters between 1944 and 1946, was 
already a committed socialist. He embraced the idea of the oppressed Japanese 
proletariat who were victims of an imperialist and capitalist war.94 Fellers’ view 
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of Japan was already formed. And his public reputation rested in part on his 
status as a believer in Japanese liberalism. At a lunch in his honour by the 
Kokunsha Club in 1946 he was hailed as ‘gallant American officer, a Christian 
gentleman with lofty ideals and gentle heart who is eager to see the Japanese 
people be saved from the yoke of militarism.’95 In 1971 he was awarded the 
Second Order of the Sacred Treasure by Emperor Hirohito for his contribution to 
Japanese-American friendship. Fellers had assisted the emperor’s entourage in 
preparing for the Tokyo war crimes trials. Hirohito’s liaison officer, Terasaki 
Hidenari, who was instrumental in recasting the emperor’s public image, was 
Fellers’ relative. As well as defending Hirohito, Fellers had a profound 
commitment to the public mystique of General Douglas MacArthur, whom he 
promoted as a talismanic genius. ‘His grasp of Japanese psychology has saved 
the lives of thousands of American boys.’96 Thus the leading psywarists had 
emotional and political investments in the ideas they articulated and strong 
allegiances to their heroes.  
 
To understand the dynamics of observation at this level, consider three major 
themes of the mythology: naïve monarchism, the suicidal elite and strategic 
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coercion. Each element of this ideology can be seen in Answer to Japan, a 
document published on 1 July 1944 that was distributed to propagandists and 
based upon Fellers’ earlier study in 1935, The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier. 
National character and ‘national personality’ analysis underpinned this work. It 
found the Japanese prone to ‘super-aggressiveness, face-saving, tradition of self-
destruction, inflexibility, brutality, venality of some military leaders, 
suspiciousness, intense emotionality, attachment to home and family, Emperor-
worship.’97 We thus move from careful analysis to caricature. This demonstrates 
how American observers were receptive to views of Japan that were ahistorical 
and woven in myth.  
 
 
Naïve Monarchism 
A central principle of American psywar was the necessity of truth. Only appeals 
based upon the objective realities of the conflict and the lived experience of 
Japanese troops and civilians could ultimately succeed. Yet ironically, the same 
figures who prided themselves on objective truth-based operations were the ones 
who helped develop one of the most misleading, potent and long-lasting fictions, 
the notion that the emperor was an innocent captive of a military clique and a 
champion of peace. At the Manila conference in May 1945, when one participant 
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asked Mashbir whether the Japanese people were aware of the changing 
historical role of the emperor, he underscored that policy imperatives as well as 
innocent truth-telling were driving American propaganda: ‘As long as we can 
really depend upon their blind obedience to the Emperor, it works just as well 
for us as it did for them. We must stress the fact that his people deceived him.’98  
 
The notion of the virtuous ruler as the benevolent patron, intercessor and 
protector, taken captive or undermined by an evil clique that mediated between 
the ruler and the ruled, is not peculiar to Japan, but was a particular permutation 
of a generic ideology that can be called ‘naïve monarchism.’99 In embracing this 
myth of the Emperor system, American propagandists were in line with former 
Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, who also saw 
the emperor as the constitutionalist pacifist who had become the captive of 
militarists, and various Japanists, including Ruth Benedict and John Embree, 
who claimed that Japan’s war was willed by small clique of militarists who held 
the emperor captive.100 Outsiders successfully urged Fellers on this point.101 
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Writing publicly after the war, Fellers described Hirohito as ‘always a pacifist 
who had been made a tool of the fanatic militarists without means of fighting 
back.’102 Fellers was not entirely ahistorical. He acknowledged how recent the 
new strain of militarism and the emperor-system were. But he played up the 
‘symbol monarchy’ myth. He absolved Hirohito of blame, while crediting him 
with ending the conflict and thwarting the militarists by overruling his council 
and using his authority to order surrender. This was a self-contradiction. As 
Herbert Bix observes, it left unexplained ‘why, if he had been strong enough to 
surrender his empire at the end of the war, he had not been equally strong 
enough to have prevented war in the first place, thereby saving millions of 
lives.’103 Indeed, Bix, Iguchi, Swann and Yamada Akira have now challenged the 
myth that the emperor was a purely ceremonial figure outside politics with no 
responsibility for initiating the war or for its subsequent conduct.104 They argue 
that the emperor who later posed as a prisoner of the ‘gangster militarists’ 
exercised considerable independent power and influence, and indeed meddled 
frequently in the conduct of the war. 
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This author is not qualified to appraise the new scholarship. But it is clear that 
the above ideas with their heavy political freight turned psywarists towards 
mythmaking. There was intensive debate in Washington over whether to regard 
the emperor as a device of the militarists or as the willing agent of a war of 
aggression. A body of opinion in the US wanted Hirohito to be held responsible 
for the war and its crimes, including Secretary of State Joseph Byrnes, Acting 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State Benjamin Cohen, 
and the Joint Resolution 94 introduced in the Senate in September 1945 that 
demanded Hirohito be tried as war criminal. With his own influence and role on 
MacArthur’s staff and with the Imperial court, Fellers coordinated testimonies 
for the Tokyo trials, allegedly saying in early March 1946 to Navy Minister Yonai 
Mitsumasa ‘it would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us 
that the Emperor is completely blameless’ by having people such as these and 
‘Tojo, in particular, being made to bear all responsibility’ on 6 March 1946, a 
statement recorded probably by Mizota Shuichi, Yonai’s interpreter.105 Whether 
or not he said this, he asserted the emperor’s innocence at every turn. 
 
As well as mythologizing the emperor, Fellers tended to homogenize the 
Japanese population and its relationship with the emperor. In his memorandum 
of 2 October 1945, he claimed that ‘…all hold their Emperor in reverential 
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awe.’106 In contrast to his increasingly discriminate and measured analysis of the 
IJA, he presented a caricature of Japan as a society with contradictions, 
complexities and internal conflicts erased. The people’s reactions were uniform, 
and they were victims and recipients of events, not responsible agents. ‘Duped 
by gangsters imbued with dreams of Destiny, the people stood ready to support 
any act of aggression.’107 There was some validity to this interpretation of 
Japanese militarism, but it oversimplifies the role of popular will, given the 
massive public support for the war at its beginning. It also overstates the 
distinction between military imperialists and civilian imperialists, and overlooks 
the popularity of the imperialist cause amongst the Japanese public before the 
home islands suffered the attrition of war.108  
 
Crucial here is not the falsity of these myths, but that US propagandists regarded 
them as attractive ideas to be propagated, not hypotheses to be tested. While 
they consistently refuted sweeping stereotypes at the front, they were active in 
strengthening them in Washington DC. The epitome of this mythmaking was the 
approach of MacArthur and his staff to the issue of war crimes charges, where 
they were determined to clear the emperor without investigating the available 
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evidence. Fellers’ most forceful rationale for upholding the emperor ideology 
and advocating Hirohito’s innocence was a hard-headed pragmatic and strategic 
one. It suited American policy. The US could use the emperor’s authority to 
ensure political stability and order, democratise Japan and keep the costs of 
occupation down. That Fellers consciously aligned his problematic ideology of 
Japan with the interests of American statecraft is evident in his written advice to 
MacArthur. He warned that ‘If the Emperor were tried for war crimes the 
governmental structure would collapse and a general uprising would be 
inevitable…Although they are disarmed, there would be chaos and bloodshed. It 
would necessitate a large expeditionary force with many thousands of public 
officials. The period of occupation would be prolonged and we would have 
alienated the Japanese…In the long run it is of paramount, national importance 
that Japan harbour no lasting resentment.’109  
 
The Suicidal Elite  
Another element of the mythology about Japan was the theme of the suicidal 
elite who took the country to war and catastrophe. The propagandists handled 
Japanese suicide inconsistently. At lower levels, as we have seen, they 
increasingly approached suicide as a behaviour that is voluntary or artificially 
programmed and not inherent in a culture. They appealed to Japanese soldiers 
on the basis that they had a choice and should abandon the death cult. Indeed, 
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they attempted to widen divisions between officers and soldiers by ridiculing the 
commanders’ failure to live up to the code of self-sacrifice. They also tried to 
discourage troops from suicide by denouncing the example of Admiral Nugumo 
who committed Suppuku at Saipan, saying this left troops without a leader.110 
But at higher military and political levels, they presented suicide as an almost 
automated, cultural reflex, driven by an ancient samurai code, and encouraged it. 
Depending upon their audience, they veered between accusing officers of being 
self-indulgent deviants from Japanese warrior values, and then trying to get 
them to kill themselves. 
 
According to Fellers, Japan’s attack on America was an insane gesture, akin to 
collective national suicide, like medieval Samurai, determined to save ‘face’ and 
frustrated with an insoluble problem. ‘As a final, supreme, moral protest the 
Tokyo gangster militarists struck Pearl Harbor. It was a war of stark madness 
which in the end could lead only to national hara-kiri. Most of the Tokyo 
gangster militarists realized this but an irrepressible inner force compelled them 
to strike.’111 ‘Moral Protest’ was how he also described hara-kiri, so the parallel 
was deliberate. Again, Fellers overplayed a mythology here – the Orientalist 
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archetype of the irrational Eastern enemy heedless of death and obsessed with 
honour. While the attack on Pearl Harbor may not have been the most skilfully 
calculated move given the risks, and involved an under-estimation of American 
political will, it was a calculated risk for national aggrandisement rather than 
self-destructive emotion or insanity. Japan’s strategy was to create a south Asian 
empire shielded by a defensive perimeter of bases and fortifications and the 
sword of a powerful navy, to impose prohibitive costs on the US and its allies in 
order to force them to accept the new reality.112 Thus there was an element of 
strategic calculation, even if it was also miscalculation, that Fellers overlooked. 
 
At a high level, the PWB were also confident that they could exploit the suicidal 
impulse. As Japan suffered shattering defeats, propagandists proposed to make 
commanders and cabinet kill themselves with news of defeat and ridicule.113  In 
response to Mashbir’s question ‘When do we start killing the high command?’, 
Fellers anticipated Japanese defeats at Okinawa, Luzon and Mindanae and 
argued that by confronting them with their past boasts and present failures, they 
                                                 
112 As Denis Showalter argues, this thinking was based ‘not on American effeteness, but on 
American rationality. Americans were businessmen, not samurai. Eventually they would 
calculate costs and benefits, and come to terms with the realities created by Japanese arms.’ 
Dennis Showalter, ‘Storm over the Pacific: Japan’s road to empire and war’ in Daniel Marston 
(ed.) The Pacific War Companion, pp.16-29, 28. 
113 John Hiestand Papers, Hoover Institution, Box 1, Letter, Sidney Mashbir to Bonner Fellers, 26 
October 1944: ‘You now have a brand new set of Admirals all ready to commit suicide. With 
particular emphasis on the Formosan ‘victory’ you can do the cabinet a very considerable amount 
of no damn good at all by the same methods.’  
51 
could draw blood.114 This entailed a problematic concept of culture, of people as 
mechanistic rule-followers. In explaining the suicide of Japanese admirals, Fellers 
drew on the same myths propagated by Japan’s regime. ‘Japan’s sturdy warriors 
are imbued with religious super-patriotism. From the Samurai, they inherited a 
code of honour. This code demands a loyalty without parallel. It requires 
absolute devotion, even unto the performance of self-destruction. The Samurai 
established hara-kiri as a means of preserving honor and of expressing supreme 
and final moral protest against adversity which they could not avoid. If a warrior 
is thwarted in the achievement of success, his brooding drives him to 
desperation. Then an overpowering inner force compels him to resort to hara-
kiri. Under such circumstances, the warrior actually seeks death, and to all 
Japanese hara-kiri is a natural, proper, logical release.’115 Suicide ‘to all Japanese’ 
was not only natural but a compulsive national instinct. At times hara-kiri was 
‘as necessary to the Japanese as extreme unction is to a devout Catholic.’116 Here 
again we see the signposts of a mythological approach to knowing the enemy. In 
contrast to the discriminating and measured analysis of the IJA, Fellers uses 
rhetoric, makes homogenising claims (‘all Japanese’), and deploys the vision he 
formed before the war rather than evidence accumulated during it. 
                                                 
114 BF Box 4, Folder 1: Letter, Fellers to Lt. Col. Woodall Greene, 25 May 1945: ‘Let’s earmark 
those responsible: study their lives, their record, their boasts. Then let’s call on them to pay the 
supreme price for failure. Let’s also earmark the political leader who seems most responsible. 
This will require research, planning and art in presentation. But let’s do it. If forcefully presented 
we shall draw blood.’ 
115 BF Box 3, Folder 6: Bonner Fellers, ‘Suggested Psychological Warfare Material’, 25 December 
1944. 
116 ‘Answer to Japan’, p.5. 
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The notion of an automatically suicidal elite, like the notion of an 
undifferentiated Japanese attitude, was misleading. Suicide was clearly a 
prominent feature in Japanese experience of war, but the picture was more 
textured than Fellers presented. There were choices, and many key men did not 
obey the script. After defeat at Midway, carrier group commander Admiral 
Nagumo, who later killed himself, persuaded his staff not to commit suicide. 
Suicides of cabinet ministers in Japan after defeat were very few, with exceptions 
such as former War Minister Korechika Anami. Many other elites did not kill 
themselves but were arrested, tried for war crimes, and were either executed or 
imprisoned for life. There were hundreds of suicides in the immediate wake of 
defeat. But these were only a small minority of officers (approximately 300 army 
and 50 navy). The vast majority of both military officers and civilian bureaucrats 
did not commit suicide. One widespread response to defeat was the worldly 
behaviour of destroying documents to erase wartime records, and the theft of 
military supplies.117 Apart from suicide, there were a variety of responses and 
coping strategies, and many of these are generic more than Japan-specific. They 
included denial and negation, isolation, political identification with and 
acceptance of the new order, personalized in MacArthur as protector.118  
 
                                                 
117 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.39. 
118 Michio Kitahara, ‘Japanese Responses to the Defeat in World War II’ International Journal of 
Social Psychiatry 30 (1984), pp.178-187. 
53 
Strategic Coercion 
The propagandists also had great expectations of strategic coercion. Postwar 
scholarship shows that countervalue coercion via strategic bombing - the use of 
violence aimed at hostile populations, governments or economic centres to exact 
political concessions - has a poor record of success.119 But without this hindsight, 
US propagandists persistently over-estimated their capacity to engineer an 
internal revolution in Japan from the skies. Fellers combined an idealistic vision 
of liberal Japan with an inflated view of what strategic bombing could achieve.120 
In some instances he showed a reasoned scepticism. He resisted a proposal to 
drop ashes of dead Japanese combatants onto the homeland as a measure that 
might be counter-productive.121 But generally, he was myopic about the 
dynamics of strategic coercion.  
 
                                                 
119 I derive this definition from Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in 
Modern Battle (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), pp.8-9; see also Robert Pape, Bombing 
to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 25; Daniel Byman 
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120 Fellers became an advocate of air power. His advocacy of the subject extended into the Cold 
War with Wings for Peace: A Primer for a New Defence (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953). 
121 BF Box 4, Folder 1: Memorandum from Fellers to Lt. Col. Woodall Greene, 17 June 1945: ‘Our 
bombing operations over Japan will increase in weight, frequency, and intensity until total 
destruction of Japan’s transport, principal cities, utilities and industry is achieved. It will also be 
one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history…To drop the ashes 
of their loved ones from these same airplanes which are destroying their families might not 
achieve the desired result…It possibly would be good psychology to drop a dignified leaflet 
stating that the ashes of 7,000 warriors have been found and will be returned to the Japanese 
homeland at the close of the war. This course would invite the attention to our respect for the 
dead and accomplish much of the desired effect without the risk of inciting rage still further over 
our indiscriminate bombing.’ 
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Propagandists entertained ever-shifting theories of victory, many of which 
turned out to be misguided. In a memorandum just before MacArthur approved 
the creation of the PWB, Fellers outlined the goals they would pursue. Through 
their communications, they would incite hara-kiri, provoke attacks ‘under 
conditions favourable to us’, exploit superstition, show how military gangsters 
have betrayed the emperor, and foment a revolt of Japanese population against 
the militarists.122 Then in Answer to Japan, Fellers predicted that once America 
isolated and by-passed Japan’s ground forces and annihilated its fleet, and 
destroyed its industry, and once the masses and the emperor realized the 
devastation that had been inflicted, it would induce a collective suicide amongst 
the ‘military gangsters’ and most of the responsible commanders. In atonement 
for the misfortune that had been brought on the emperor, they would scatter 
‘‘entrails Nipponese’ all over the Pacific.’ In turn, with the warlords’ fall, panic 
would overtake Japan as a typical reaction to chaos, as took place after the 
earthquake of 1923. Mashbir and Fellers interpreted the earthquake as proof of 
Japanese superstition and mental fragility.123 This would lead to a civilian 
                                                 
122 BF Box 41, Folder 8: Memorandum, Fellers to the Collation Section of PWB, 29 August 1944. 
123 BF Box 4, Folder 1: Letter, Lt. Col. Woodall Greene to Fellers, 13 December 1944: ‘Colonel 
Mashbir suggested that we prepare some leaflets on the earthquake. He thinks it should be 
played up in every way possible using the theme of divine punishment for starting this war.’ In 
‘Answer to Japan’, pp.21-22, Fellers wrote: ‘With the fall of the military leadership, disaster and 
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mentally, become unpredictable, and chaos results. Chaos followed the great earthquake of 1923. 
It will follow the bombing of 1944. For their own salvation the Japanese must be subjected to 
complete mental and physical disintegration.’  
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uprising which would make peace with an Imperial sanction.124 In January 1945, 
Fellers sketched an alternative scenario, where with the fall of the Philippines 
‘the reality of losing there will pressure Japs to make peace.’125 This gradually 
gave way to a theory of bombing-induced collapse, so that by December 1944 
and more formally in March 1945, Fellers’ concept of victory was to turn the civil 
population against the military, ‘inviting’ them against the background of 
massive bombardment to overthrow the government, rescue the emperor and 
sue for peace.126 He sketched this vision in a memorandum to MacArthur on 28 
March 1945.127 By June 1945, with an implied realization that bombing would not 
suffice, Fellers changed his position, predicting that psywar broadcasts would 
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126 BF Box 4, Folder 1: Letter, Fellers to Lt. Col. Woodall Greene, 24 December 1944: ‘…play on the 
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be seen. The military will have a poor case. Key men are likely to commit hara-kiri. Eventually, 
opposition of the people to the military should succeed.’  
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soften up Japan, forcing them to sue for peace once the invasion was 
underway.128 
 
These prognostications were mistaken on many levels. Most elite suicides took 
place after the emperor’s formal surrender and acceptance of the Joint 
Declaration on 14 August 1945.129 They were a reaction to surrender rather than 
the cause. Fellers’ notion that the incineration of Japanese cities would galvanise 
the population into a mass uprising was a misreading of the effects of strategic 
bombing. The civil population did not overthrow the regime during the war, 
though growing popular criticism of the throne was a real fear that probably 
contributed to the decision to surrender.130 If anything, Japan’s capitulation was 
choreographed as a top-down affair. Contrary to the stereotype of a people easily 
panicked into chaos, the majority reaction of Japanese people to defeat was an 
orderly demobilization. These three scenarios - inducing elite suicide, 
capitulation after loss of Philippines, popular revolution –all placed great 
expectations on their ability to overcome Japanese resilience. The mind war, at 
least as it was directed at the Japanese homeland, persistently did not have the 
dramatic effects that its managers anticipated.  
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US psywar specialists spearheaded the post-war critique of the atomic bombings, 
claiming they were strategically unnecessary partly because propaganda had 
already pierced Japan’s mental armour.131 They argued that skilled psywar built 
on America’s overwhelming military advantage had already brought Japan to 
the brink of surrender. By April 1945, they argued, the conditions for surrender 
were in place. Japan’s industry was devastated, its air force an irrelevance, its 
strongholds destroyed in the key Pacific Islands and the Philippines, and its fleet 
and merchant shipping lost. Only one final barrier remained, the psychological 
one. It was then that activities such as the dropping of leaflets explaining the 
Potsdam Declaration persuaded the emperor that the US intended an acceptable 
peace.132 Fellers and Linebarger stressed the heroic efforts of the emperor to 
negotiate a surrender via Soviet mediation from February 1945 onwards, a view 
Fellers maintained into his final years.133 Zacharias claimed that his radio 
broadcasts, which distinguished unconditional surrender from ‘dictated peace’ 
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Decision to Surrender’ in Marc Gallicchio (ed.) Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in U.S.-East Asian 
Relations (Durham, Durham University Press, 2007), pp.51-84. This argument dovetailed with the 
ideas of Grew, like-minded officials and revisionist historians that in May, June or July America 
could have compromised on the question of guaranteeing the dynasty, and Japan would have 
surrendered. Likewise, British historian George Taylor who was Deputy Director for the Far East 
at the Office of War Information, along with over a dozen anthropologists he had recruited, had 
sent a memo to President Truman stating that the Japanese were ready to surrender. See David 
Price, ‘Lessons from Second World War Anthropology: Peripheral, Persuasive and Ignored 
Contributions’ Anthropology Today 18:3 (June 2002), pp.14-20, p.19. 
132 BF Box 41 Folder 7: ‘Report on Psychological Warfare against Japan, Southwest Pacific Area, 
1944-1945’, pp. 4, 13-14. 
133 BF Box 1 Folder 2: ‘Hirohito’s Struggle to Surrender’ article, later published in Reader’s Digest 
(July 1947), pp.90-95; in an interview on 19 January 1973, Fellers insisted ‘that bomb should never 
have been dropped, never in the world…They were trying to surrender for two or three years – 
and we knew it!’ BF, Box 17 Folder 11: Interview with Dale Hellegers; See also the lecture by Paul 
Linebarger, Linebarger Papers, Hoover Institution, Box 12 Folder 2: ‘Psychological Warfare: A 
Lecture by Dr. Paul M.A. Linebarger 19 April 1950’ pp.10-11. 
58 
and suggested the Japanese could determine their own government, left Japan 
‘ready for surrender.’134 The alternative to the atomic strikes was not an invasion 
of the Home Islands or continued blockade and bombing, but a peaceful 
negotiated surrender. Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented the triumph of the 
war of brutality over the war of reason. Without bombings, psychological 
warfare would have delivered the ultimate prize.  
 
This revisionism was oversimplified. It reflects the propagandists’ wartime 
mythology about the emperor’s heroism, and an attempt to present psywar as a 
war-winning enterprise. It overlooked the terms of victory, and the difference 
between an occupied and disarmed Japan and a status quo Japan that was still 
potentially a host for imperial expansion. Fresh evidence also throws doubt on 
the notion that Japan was about to surrender. Decoded MAGIC intercepts of 
Japanese diplomatic cables, the secret communications between Foreign Minister 
Shigenori Togo and Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow, show that even an 
offer of unconditional surrender that promised the retention of the emperor and 
the kokutai (the political order and Japanese sovereignty) would have met strong 
opposition in government.135 Before the atomic bombings and Soviet entry into 
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the war, Hirohito himself was not trying to make peace as a ceremonial 
figurehead, but to preserve an authoritarian imperial system with himself and 
the ‘empowered throne’ at the core, and only with modest territorial concessions. 
If the scholarship of Bix holds, Japan’s rulers had not been mentally disarmed to 
the extent American revisionists suggested.  
 
Conclusion 
Existing literature on US psywar drives in two directions. Those historians who 
examine American perceptions of Japanese high politics and general society 
argue that they were often flawed and rooted in misleading myths. Whereas 
those who study assessments of Japanese military behaviour, particularly at the 
Pacific battlefronts, stress that they were increasingly discriminating and 
measured. This article endorses both views and reconciles them. Depending on 
their level of analysis, American observers alternated between mythmaking and 
rational (if imperfect) observation. This had a number of causes, including the 
quality and nature of the information and the influence of pre-war attitudes. 
Above all, it was because of the interaction between policy and perception. The 
pragmatic needs of the military in interpreting and seeking to break the IJA’s 
combat motivation encouraged the pursuit of a ‘scientific’ evaluation. This 
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process was not myth-free and its architects inflated their successes. 
Nevertheless, exposure to evidence and to Japanese prisoners themselves, and 
the desire for more complex images of the enemy fostered a resistance to 
stereotypes, an attention to the accuracy of ‘enemy profiles’ and the audiences’ 
reception of propaganda. By contrast, the evolving political agenda from the 
closing months of the war encouraged the articulation of a mythology about 
Japan that purified the emperor, split the militarist clique from the Japanese 
people, and supplied a convenient vocabulary through which victors and 
vanquished could accept America’s new relationship with defeated Japan. The 
propagandists who prided themselves on truth-telling protected the new order 
with a useful bodyguard of lies. 
 
 
